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This paper focuses on the different development strategies of
China and India, particularly regarding the role of
manufacturing and services, for long-run productivity growth,
external competitiveness and financial fragility. The findings
appear to support the argument that productivity improvements
in manufacturing drive productivity improvements in other
sectors. They also substantiate previous findings that the
Indian services-led growth trajectory has had limited success
in transferring surplus labor from agriculture to other
sectors. Furthermore, the trajectories have affected the
export performances of the two countries with the Indian trade
balance and current account revealing persistent deficits,
compared to China's surpluses. The paper also argues that the
way in which India has sought to sustain these deficits
entails elements of financial fragility, and that the Chinese
struggles with the internationalization of the renminbi also
imply a possibility of financial instability.
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India and China have been lionized in the international
press as two of the developing economies that will take over
the world economy in the twenty-first century.3The rapid rates
of economic growth that the two countries have experienced
over the last three decades have been central to these
optimistic predictions. This growth performance has attracted
special attention because India and China are among two of the
largest economies in the developing world, accounting for onethird of the total world population and two-thirds of the
world's poor (Aziz 2008). In particular, the growth of China
is seen with apprehension in the advanced or central
economies. Niall Ferguson (2011: 9) said, for example, that
“the key to China’s dominance during the 21 stcentury ultimately
lies in the decline of the West.”
Previous studies have shown that despite similarities in
terms of rapid growth rates, there are major differences in
the growth trajectories of the two economies (e.g., Mukherji
2005, Bosworth and Collins 2008, Herd and Dougherty 2007 and
Bhattacharyay and Bhattacharyay 2016). In China, the
industrial and manufacturing sectors have been the leading
sectors whereas in India, the services sector has been the
driver of growth. Some of these studies have decomposed the
sources of growth and patterns of investment in the two
countries. However, they have not focused on the implications
of the services versus manufacturing-led growth trajectories
for long-run productivity growth, external competitiveness and
financial fragility.
This paper focuses on these specific issues, and the
broader implications suggested by the Indian and Chinese
experience for other developing countries. The evidence
appears to support the argument that productivity improvements
in manufacturing drive productivity improvements in other
sectors, and that manufacturing matters. In other words, what
a country produces and exports is central for development,
something emphasized by structuralist authors and rediscovered
more recently in the development literature (Hausmann and
Hidalgo, 2011; Felipe et al., 2014). The evidence also
substantiates previous findings that the Indian services-led
growth trajectory has had limited success in transferring
3

The term developing countries has for the most part been abandoned and
official documents and the press often refer to Emerging Market Economies
(EME), without any discussion of the reason behind the changes, and the
consequences of uncritically accepting the new terminology. For a
discussion with the confines of the law see Salacuse (1999).
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surplus labor from agriculture to other sectors, with more
than half of the labor force continuing to be concentrated in
agriculture where productivity remains very low.4 As against
this, notwithstanding continuing problems of quality
employment generation and income inequalities in China, the
emergence of industry as the leading sector means that China
has been more successful at transferring labor from
agriculture to industry, one of the traditional engines of
economic growth and higher productivity as discussed long ago
by Arthur Lewis.
Furthermore, the different growth trajectories have had
an impact on the export performances of the two countries with
the Indian trade balance and current account revealing
persistent deficits, compared to China's surpluses, which
might however start dwindling under pressure in the new era of
trade wars and protectionism. The paper argues that the way in
which India has sought to sustain these deficits entails
elements of financial fragility, and that the Chinese
struggles with the internationalization of the yuan (or
renminbi) also imply a possibility of financial instability.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. To provide
a context to the contribution of this paper, Section 2
evaluates the existing literature on the comparative
development of India and China. Section 3 presents the major
trends in terms of GDP growth, sectoral compositions of output
and employment, productivity performance and public investment
in the two countries. Section 4 analyzes the implications of
the two growth trajectories for long-run productivity growth,
external competitiveness and financial fragility in the two
countries. Section 5 presents the conclusions, and the
implications for policy and development strategies suggested
by the Indian and Chinese experience.

The Comparative Development of China and India
The rapid economic growth of China and India over the
last three decades has sparked off significant interest in
comparisons of their growth and development experience. The
literature has compared economic policies, financial factors,
the importance of exports, sectors driving economic growth and
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For an analysis of productivity growth in the agricultural sector, see
Nabar-Bhaduri (2011 and 2012).
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the sustainability of rapid economic growth in terms of
certain demand and supply-side factors.
With respect to economic policies, studies note that till
the late 1970s for China and the early 1990s for India, the
State played a major role in organizing economic activity, and
there was an emphasis on import substitution for achieving a
certain degree of self-reliance (Mukherji, 2005; Prime, 2009;
Bhattacharyay and Bhattacharyay 2016). Movements towards
economic reforms in China began in 1978 under the leadership
of Deng Xiaoping, as economic successes came to be seen as
vital to the political survival of the Chinese Communist Party
following the Cultural Revolution period. There was an
increased willingness to experiment with market forces in a
gradual and cautious manner (Nolan, 2012 and 2014). The late
1970s and early 1980s witnessed the opening up of the Chinese
economy to foreign investment and a gradual transfer of the
management and ownership of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) to
private entities. Privatization has been selective, with large
enterprises in strategic industries remaining state-owned,
while small and medium-sized enterprises have been removed
from state control.5The purpose of such selective privatization
has been to nurture large firms in strategic industries and
make them globally competitive (Mukherji, 2005; Nolan, 2012
and 2014). This is a far cry from simplistic notions of the
primacy of property rights, often emphasized in the New
Institutionalist literature (e.g. Acemoglu and Robinson,
2012).
Unlike China where political factors were central to the
initiation of economic reforms, studies note that the main
factor triggering reforms in India was the 1991 balance of
payments (BOP) crisis, with the government on the verge of
defaulting on its external debt.6Reforms included abolishing
the industrial licensing regime, reducing tariff rates and
quantitative import restrictions, and relaxing restrictions on
5

The strategic industries include telecoms, oil and chemicals, aerospace,
military and related equipment, construction, and electricity generation
and distribution among others. For the complete list, see Nolan(2014).
6 Sporadic and minor liberalization measures, involving the relaxation of
some import controls and licensing requirements, were introduced in India
in the early years after independence, and in the late 1970s. The mid1980s witnessed more pronounced measures to liberalize the trade and
industrial regime, some of which provided the basis for the large-scale
reforms initiated in 1991 (Panagariya, 2003). Nevertheless, the mid-1980s
initiatives were far more limited in their scope than those that were
introduced in 1991, and the State continued to play a prominent role in
industrial allocation.
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capital flows and foreign exchange(Mukherji,
2005;Bhattacharyay and Bhattacharyay 2016). The removal of the
industrial licensing regime paved the way for increased
private participation in activities that were previously
dominated by the public sector such as telecommunications,
energy, mining, airlines and finance. Mukherji (2005) notes
that unlike China, the political checks that arise from a
participatory democracy have meant that privatization has been
on a smaller scale in India. He also notes that while China
has emphasized retaining state ownership of large strategic
firms, post-reform economic policy in India has emphasized
reserving the production of certain consumer goods for small
firms with a view to promoting employment generating growth.
While studies reveal that trade and exports of both
countries have grown with their increased global integration,
the magnitudes have been greater for China than
India.7Moreover, the composition of the exports have been very
different, with Chinese exports being dominated by
manufactured goods and Indian exports being dominated by
services, specifically information technology (IT) services
and business processing services, in particular data
management and call centers (Mukherji, 2005; Bosworth and
Collins, 2008; Prime, 2009; Bhattacharyay and Bhattacharyay,
2016).
Some of the comparative literature has also focused on
the financial sectors of the two economies. In a firm-level
study using data from the World Business Environment Survey
(WBES), Huang (2006) found that while firms in both countries
reported financing constraints, the types of constraints were
different. In China, the size of the firm was the main
constraint, with lending by the financial sector being biased
towards large enterprises. Some of this bias may reflect the
policy preferences of the government in terms of developing
globally competitive large enterprises in strategic
industries, and the fact that the banking system is
fundamentally state-controlled.

7For

China, from 22 percent in 1980, the share of trade in GDP rose to 59
percent by 2011, while the share of exports amounted to around one-third of
GDP in 2011. In India, the share of trade in GDP rose from 15 percent in
1980 to 54 percent by 2011, while the share of exports amounted to around
one-fifth of GDP in 2011 (Prime, 2009; Bhattacharyay and Bhattacharyay,
2016).
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In other words, a policy of National Champions seems to
be one of the driving forces in the Chinese development
strategy (Hemphill and White, 2013). In India, the main
financing constraint arose due to the underdeveloped nature of
the risk assessment abilities of financial institutions.
Furthermore, the level of non-performing loans in China has
tended to be higher than in India, suggesting greater
financial fragility in the Chinese banking system, even though
it must be emphasized that this refers to debt accumulated in
domestic currency, something that is considerably less risky
than in foreign currency. Similar conclusions about the
greater financial fragility in China have been made in Saez
(2004), Swamy (2006) and Aziz (2008). 8
Finally, some studies have focused on decomposing the
supply and demand-side sources of growth in the two countries,
and have also shown that industry has been the leading sector
in China, while services has been the leading sector in India
(Bosworth and Collins, 2007; Herd and Dougherty, 2007; Felipe,
Fan and Laviña, 2008). Bosworth and Collins (2007) and Herd
and Dougherty (2007) use a growth accounting approach which
focuses on supply-side factors. Felipe et al. (2008) use an
income and expenditure approach that emphasizes the role of
capital accumulation from both the demand (investment is an
important component of aggregate demand) and the supply-side
(capital is a factor of production). One common finding of
these three studies is that higher investment rates and,
hence, faster capital accumulation have been central to the
more rapid growth performance of China in terms of per capita
income and labor productivity.9

8

Some authors have emphasized the role of shadow banking and the
possibility that it would lead to the Minsky type financial fragility.
Huang (2017: 16) argues that: “the Chinese government is in a good position
to indirectly regulate shadow banking transactions through the formal
banking sector.” This view might take a narrow definition of shadow
banking. Gabor (2018) argues convincingly that the celebratory view of
market-based finance might cloud the ability of Chinese authorities to
regulate financial innovations, and that the risk in China is greater than
often understood. While admitting that this is true, we remain confident on
the ability of a central bank to act as a lender of the last resort in its
own currency. The issue of whether debt is denominated in domestic or
foreign currency is then central to understanding financial fragility.
9 Note that while public investment is indeed autonomous and is a source of
demand-led growth, most evidence on private investment suggests that it
follows the accelerator principle and is, as a result, induced demand,
being the result of economic growth and not its cause. For recent estimates
of accelerator coefficients for a large group of countries see IMF (2015).
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With respect to growth sustainability, Herd and Dougherty
(2007) suggest that China may face growth constraints in the
long-run due to the effects of demographic changes (a decline
in the share of the population in the working age group) on
the savings and investment rates. In India, favorable
demographic factors in terms of a growing share of population
in the working age group and a decline in the dependency
ratio, along with a growth in retained earnings in private and
public enterprises suggest that it would be able to achieve
and sustain higher rates of growth over the next two decades.
This follows the conventional literature on the so-called
demographic transition, which suggests that it was central for
the so-called economic miracles in Asia (Bloom and Williamson,
1998). In the same vein, it is presumed that an eventual
graying of the population, with an increase in the dependency
ratio may lead to what has been termed as a middle-income trap
(Eichengreen et al., 2012). The story builds on the
conventional Solow or neoclassical supply-side model of
growth, in which savings drive investment, and savings are
tied to demographic factors.10
In contrast, Felipe et al. (2008) argue that China could
face a constraint to future growth due to a declining
productivity of capital. They emphasize that while greater
urbanization in China has created a demand for capitalintensive physical infrastructure, the resulting pace of
industrialization has created an excess supply of
infrastructure, housing and consumer goods. This has caused
the productivity of capital to decline over the last two
decades, which in turn has caused the rate of profit to fall.
A falling rate of profit is likely to deter future investment
demand and, hence, capital accumulation and economic growth.
While Felipe et al. (2008) provide a contrast with the
conventional literature, emphasizing the role of demand in the
process of economic growth, growth is driven by investment
which, in turn, follows the rate of profit. As noted above,
the empirical evidence seems to suggest that private
investment follows an accelerator mechanism, and that the

10

While Eichengreen (2011) argues that the demographic transition plays a
significant role in the middle-income trap, the argument suggests that the
bulk of the slowdown in economic growth should be seen in a fall in
productivity. The suggestion is similar to the one put forward by Gordon
(2016) for advanced economies, and relies on the slower pace of innovation
associated with the information technologies of the third industrial
revolution as compared to the previous two.
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capacity generating effect of investment is driven by a need
to adjust the supply side to the autonomous non-capacity
generating elements of demand. In that sense, not only public
investment, and exports, but also autonomous consumption are
central elements of demand-led stories of economic growth.11
This opens the question about the possibilities of growth
associated with the expansion of mass consumption in domestic
markets in both economies, a potential not fully realized.
Shares of global consumption remain small, in particular in
India, with significant expansion in China, more markedly
after the global financial crisis, as seen in Figure 1.
Chinese consumption now represents around 11 percent of global
consumption, while Indian consumption is less than 3 percent,
and the United States, which shows a fluctuating, but
declining trend is still at a very high level, considering its
share of global population, at about 27 percent of global
consumption.

Figure 1 – Percent Share of World Consumption
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literature is based on the so-called supermultiplier model, which
puts emphasis on the role of autonomous, non-capacity generating demand in
promoting economic growth. For recent surveys of the literature see Smith
(2012) and Freitas and Serrano (2015).
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Source: World Development Indicators (WDI) database of the World Bank,
China Statistical Yearbooks (various years) and authors' calculations.

In addition, another aspect of the comparative growth
performance of both countries that appears to be missing from
the present comparative literature is a closer focus on the
implications of the services versus manufacturing-led growth
trajectories for long-run productivity growth, external
competitiveness and external financial fragility in the two
countries. This paper focuses on these three aspects more
closely.
It also focuses on the potential implications for
development strategies suggested by the Chinese and Indian
experiences. These questions are particularly relevant because
the Indian experience in which services has emerged as the
leading sector before industry at a relatively early stage of
development has raised the issue of whether this trajectory
provides an alternative development strategy for other
developing countries. However, services-led growth has a
limited ability to contribute to long-run productivity growth
and the generation of quality employment on a large scale, and
cannot serve as a substitute to a strategy emphasizing the
growth of the manufacturing sector (Nabar-Bhaduri and
Vernengo, 2012).In addition, growth that is overly dependent
on external markets, as has been in the case in China till
recently, and on capital flows to sustain persistent current
account deficits, as has been the case in India, must
eventually reach limits imposed by the balance of payments
constraint.
It should be noted that similar arguments appear to be
supported by analyses focusing on industrialized countries
like the United States (e.g. Cohen and Zysman, 1987;
Uchitelle, 2017).12 These contributions have emphasized that
12The

discussion of the role of manufacturing in Asia, particularly, China
has gone hand in hand with the analysis of the flip side effect, the
deindustrialization in the center (Rodrik, 2016) and other parts of the
periphery (Palma, 2008). However, one should note some limitations of the
literature on deindustrialization. Analyses that rely just on the size of
the manufacturing sector, by output or employment, might miss central
elements of manufacturing dynamism. In many ways, for example, the process
of deindustrialization in the United States, does not represent a relative
decline of the global dominance of its manufacturing sector. Block (2008)
argues that the United States has a hidden developmental state that
promotes manufacturing innovation, and that might be part of the
explanation for why deindustrialization has not hurt American manufacturing
dynamism.
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services are a complement to manufacturing, and without a
dynamic manufacturing sector, the growth and creation of
employment in the services sector cannot be sustained.

Growth Rates, Sectoral Contributions, Labor Productivity and
Public Investment
To provide an overview of the key economic aspects of the
two countries and a context to the analysis of the following
section, this section compares the real GDP and per capita
growth, sectoral compositions of output and employment, labor
productivity and public investment in China and India. Table 1
reports average growth rates for India and China over two
longer periods1952-80 and 1980-2010, associated broadly with
the Golden Age of capitalism and with the Neoliberal Era. We
also provide the comparison for each decade from 1980.

Table 1: Average Rates of Growth of Real and Per Capita GDP
in China and India
Period

Real GDP

GDP Per Capita

China

India

China

India

1952-80

6.7

3.6

4.7

1.4

1980-2010

10.2

6.2

9.1

4.3

1980-90

9.2

5.5

7.6

3.3

1990-2000

9.9

5.8

8.8

3.9

2000-10

10.7

7.2

10.1

5.6

2010-17

8.4

7.3

7.9

5.9

Source: The Conference Board Total Economy Database, and authors'
calculations

In both countries, the thirty-year period from 1980 to
2010 reveals an acceleration in the growth of real GDP and GDP
per capita compared to 1952-80, in contrast to what is typical
in both central countries and other parts of the periphery.
10

The growth rates of both variables have been greater for China
than for India, with the difference being particularly
noticeable with respect to GDP per capita. From an average
growth rate of 6.7 per cent during 1952-80, real GDP growth
increased to 10.2 per cent per year during 1980-2010 in China,
while in India the average growth rate increased from 3.6 per
cent to 6.2 per cent. However, it is important to note that
growth seems to be decelerating in China.

Figure 2 - GDP per capita PPP vs. Current (% of US)
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Source: World Development Indicators (WDI) database of the World Bank,
China Statistical Yearbooks (various years) and authors' calculations.

Also, it should be clear that, while there is a
significantly faster convergence towards United States levels
of income per capita, particularly in China, this process is
markedly less strong when measured in current dollars (left
side scale) rather than in Purchasing Power Party (PPP) (right
side bar in Figure 2). While there are good reasons to use PPP
for comparisons of well-being, for issues related to
development, which involve, the actual ability to purchase
goods and services, the current figure provides a more
accurate picture. Chinese GDP per capita is less than 14
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percent of the United States, while the Indian figure remains
below 4 percent.
For China, the 1980s captures the period when it embarked
on economic reforms in a cautious and gradual manner, with the
State retaining ownership of large SOEs in strategic
industries with a view to making these SOEs globally
competitive, and spending heavily on public investment. This
growth continued in the 1990s and 2000s, with a large part of
this growth being driven by a sharp rise in manufactured
exports, facilitated by the export orientation of foreign
firms based in China and the integration of China with East
Asian production networks, and its symbiotic relation with the
United States, a central market for its manufacturing exports
that led some authors to coin the term Chimerica (Ferguson and
Shularik, 2009).
The adverse effects of the 2007-09 Great Recession and
the Eurozone crisis of the following year on Chinese
manufactured exports, and the bursting of the real estate and
stock market bubbles in 2015 have caused the growth rate to
slightly decelerate during the 2010s, although it remains high
at 8.4 percent.13 The additional stress of the trade wars with
the United States might imply that the potential for growth
associated with an export-led strategy is gradually being
reduced. China will have to rely more on its domestic market,
and create alternative networks for international expansion,
something already being explored in both the Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI), and the Chinese leadership in South-led
financial institutions like the Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank and New Development Bank, the so-called bank
of the BRICS.
Table 1 also indicates that in India, the growth rate
accelerated in the 1980s, a decade prior to the initiation of
economic liberalization in 1991,with the country growing at a
rate of 5.5 percent over 1980-90. Moreover, this acceleration
was more pronounced relative to the liberalization decade of
the 1990s when the Indian economy grew at 5.8 percent. The
acceleration of the 1980s reflected the expansionary
13

Some economists (e.g., Ghosh, 2015) have argued that both bubbles were
the outcome of policy responses to a sharp fall in Chinese manufactured
exports to advanced economies during the 2008-09 crisis, that had driven
China's rapid economic growth till then. Note that growth is still high,
for international standards, even with deceleration. In part, this reflects
the fact that growth already was, and still is, to a great extent driven by
public investment.
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macroeconomic policies of the 1980s; a significant increase in
the investment-GDP ratio from the late 1970s, driven to some
extent by a significant increase in public investment; and
that went hand in hand with some trade liberalization and
industrial deregulation during the late 1970s and early 1980s.
Additionally, various social and institutional factors
vital to the successful functioning of an economy (a system of
higher education, entrepreneurial talent, science and
technology development, and the development of the capital
goods sector) which Indian policy-makers had been emphasizing
since independence were more established by the 1980s (Nayyar
2006).The second decade (2000-10) post-liberalization reveals
a greater acceleration relative to the 1990s, with an average
growth rate of 7.2 percent, with some of this growth being
driven by the surge in services exports.

Table 2: Sectoral Composition of Output (percentage share in total output)
China

Agriculture

Industry

Manufac.

India

Services

Agriculture

1952
-60
71.3
6.0
3.5
22.7
55.6
1960
-70
60.7
14.0
8.1
25.3
46.9
1970
-80
48.1
27.9
17.0
24.0
41.6
1980
-90
35.5
32.7
20.4
31.9
35.0
1990
-00
22.9
41.8
29.8
35.2
28.1
2000
-10
12.7
49.3
35.5
38.0
19.7
2010
-17*
8.9
42.9
30.3
48.2
16.6
Source: Timmer, et al. (2015), World Bank Development
authors’ own calculations.

Industry

Manufac.

Services

18.6

10.3

25.1

23.4

12.6

28.7

25.6

13.9

32.6

27.8

15.5

36.7

30.3

17.5

41.5

30.1

17.2

50.0

27.9
15.4
Indicators, and

47.3

*

Numbers might not be directly comparable with the ones directly above in
the table.

Table 2 shows the sectoral composition of output in China
and India. As has historically been the case in the
development process of many countries, the share of the
agricultural sector in total output has shown a decrease in
both countries over time. For China, the contribution of the
agricultural sector decreased from 71 percent of GDP during
13

the 1950s to 8.9 percent of GDP in the 2010s. In the case of
India, it has fallen from around 56 percent to 16.6 percent
over the same period.
However, the two countries reveal different trends with
respect to the relative contributions of industry and services
to GDP. In India in the decade right after independence,
industry accounted for around 19 percent of total output,
impressive for a country in the early stages of development,
and the manufacturing sector accounted for around 10.3 percent
of total GDP. These figures were higher relative to those for
China, where the industrial sector contributed only 6 percent
of total GDP, while the manufacturing sector accounted for 3.5
percent. These differences between the two countries show a
marked change in subsequent decades, with the share of
industry in China showing a meteoric rise to 49 percent of GDP
during the 2000s, making it account for the largest share in
GDP, before falling to almost 43 percent in the last decade.
The share of manufacturing has also increased by nearly tenfold to account for 35.5 percent of GDP in the 2000s, before
falling to 30.3 percent of GDP in the 2010s. On the other
hand, in India, the contributions of industry and
manufacturing in subsequent decades have risen much less
rapidly with industry accounting for 30 per cent and
manufacturing for 17 per cent of GDP in the 2000s, before
falling somewhat in the last decade.
The contribution of the services sector in China has
increased from around 23 percent in the 1950s to 38 percent in
the 2000s, and to 48.2 percent in the 2010s, in a pattern in
which for a while industry was the dominant sector. As against
this, in India, services have emerged as the sector accounting
for the largest share in GDP, with the contribution of this
sector doubling from 25 percent in the 1950s to about 50
percent in the 2000s, without a period of manufacturing
dominance, and with the persistence of a relatively large
share of agriculture in GDP.
Table 3 shows the sectoral composition of employment in
the two countries. During the 1960s, the agricultural sector
absorbed the majority of the workforce in both China and
India. While the percentage of the persons employed in
agriculture has shown a downward trend in both countries over
time, the agricultural sector still accounts for a significant
share of total employment, standing at around 20 percent in
China and 45 percent in India in the 2010s. The employment
14

share of the industrial sector was lower at 9.4 percent in
China compared to 12 percent in India during the 1960s, but
has increased over the subsequent decades and accounted for
almost 28 percent of total employment during the 2010s. In
India, the share of the industrial sector in employment has
increased less rapidly over the last five decades and stood at
around 24 percent in the 2010s. But the differences are not
large in industry.

Table 3: Sectoral Composition of Employment (percentage share
in total employment)
China
196070
197080
198090
19902000
200010
201017*

India

Agriculture

Industry

Manufac.

Services

Agriculture

Industry

Manufac.

Services

79.8

9.4

7.2

10.8

71.5

12.0

9.8

16.5

75.7

14

10.7

10.3

72.3

11.3

9.4

16.4

63.5

20.3

14.7

16.1

69.6

11.9

9.8

18.4

53.8

22.6

15.2

23.6

63.3

14.8

10.6

21.8

44.4

24.5

16.4

31.1

56.4

18.7

11.9

24.9

20.8

28.1

NA

51.1

45.5

23.8

NA

30.6

Source: See Table 2.
*These

numbers are from the ILO from the WDI data bank and might
overestimate the decrease in agricultural employment and the increase in
service employment, as compared to the previous numbers in the table.

Yet, while the employment share of the services sector
has shown an increase over the decades in both countries, the
increase appears to be more rapid in China, which has pursued
a more conventional manufacturing development strategy, rather
than India with the service-led approach. This suggests,
somewhat surprisingly that the increase in employment in
services is more efficient when manufacturing develops faster.
Note that the result suggests that the conventional Lewis
story of the transition from agriculture to manufacturing goes
hand in hand with urbanization and the increases of employment
in services. In that sense, low productivity agricultural jobs
have been the solution to the inability to incorporate workers
in the modern sector in India (Nabar-Bhaduri, 2015).
Thus, in terms of the output, while services has emerged
as the leading sector in both countries, it did so in a more
conventional way in China, with industry taking the lead and
15

promoting the process of urbanization. In terms of
employment, agriculture continues to account for a significant
share of total employment in both countries remaining a
cushion for low productivity employment, though this share has
declined more in China. The fact that more than 45 percent of
total employment in India remains in agriculture appears to
provide further support for findings of previous studies such
as Rakshit (2009) regarding the smaller employment elasticity
of the services sector. So, despite services emerging as the
leading sector in India, the ability to transfer labor from
agriculture to services has been more limited. As against
this, the faster expansion of the industrial and manufacturing
sectors in China may explain why the decrease in the
concentration of employment in agriculture has been greater
compared to India. This also suggests the limitations of a
services-led development strategy.

Table 4: Average growth of labor productivity per person
employed in India and China, 1950-2017
Average Labor Productivity Growth
China
1952-60
1960-70
1970-80
1980-90
1990-2000
2000-10
2010-17

India
6.5
1.8
5.1
4.9
7.5
10.1
8.1

2.5
2.9
0.4
3.3
4
5.8
5.7

Source: See Table 1

Table 4 shows the average growth of labor productivity
per person employed in China and India over time. Barring the
1960s, productivity has grown faster in China in each decade,
even though India's productivity growth is impressive. The
question to examine is to what extent the differences in the
growth trajectories of the two countries can help to explain
the differences in their labor productivity performance. In
particular, the role of public investment seems to be crucial.
Figure 3 shows public investment as a percentage of GDP
in India and China over the period from 1980 to 2014. The
magnitude of public investment in China (relative to GDP) has
been almost double that of India. For the period under
consideration, public investment in China has generally been
in the range of 15 to 20 percent of GDP. In India, the figure
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was a little more than 10 percent of GDP in the 1980s, but has
fallen and remained below 10 per cent of GDP since the 1990s,
the decade in which India embarked upon economic
liberalization.

Figure 3 – Public Investment (% GDP)
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Source: World Development Indicators (WDI) database of the World Bank,
China Statistical Yearbooks (various years) and authors' calculations.

This contrasts with the case of China, where public
investment increased during the 1980s, the decade in which the
Chinese leadership embarked upon economic liberalization in a
cautious manner, while adopting deliberate policies to develop
globally competitive large national companies. While the mid2000s revealed a slight downward trend in this ratio with
China adopting more pronounced liberalization measures, it
reversed during 2008-10 in the wake of the global economic
recession as China stepped up investment spending in the face
of the slowdown in its manufactured exports. In India, the
downward trend in public investment becomes more pronounced in
the late 1990s, and continues into the early part of the
2000s, with the rise of disinvestment by the government from
various public sector enterprises. This is also the period
that coincides with the acceleration in the growth of the
17

services sector in India. The declining trend in the public
investment ratio shows a marginal reversal in the latter half
of the 2000s, but has subsequently again fallen to less than 5
percent of the GDP since 2013.
These trends in public investment highlight another
important distinguishing aspect of the recent growth
strategies of China and India. The higher public investment
ratios for China show that the public sector has figured more
prominently in China's manufacturing-led growth strategy.
However, in India, the declining public investment ratio since
the 1990s points towards the greater role played by the
private sector in its services-led growth trajectory. This is
all the more important in the context of the rediscovery of
neo-mercantilist policies and the shrinking space for exportled development strategies, with important consequences for
external sustainability.

Implications of the growth trajectories for long-run
productivity growth and external accounts
Most analysis of economic growth suggests that Total
Factor Productivity (TFP) is the main driver of economic
growth, rather than emphasizing labor productivity.14A few
studies have focused on Kaldor's first law for India and
China. Kaldor (1966) asserted that there exists a strong
positive relation between the growth of manufacturing output
and the growth of GDP. The expansion of industrial production
makes it possible to draw labor from sectors having open or
disguised unemployment, and also provides advantages
associated with increasing returns (economies of scale,
learning-by-doing, external economies in production, etc.),
which are not available in the agricultural sector.
The expansion of the industrial sector then creates a
demand for services, which also spurs growth in the services
sector. For India, Dasgupta and Singh (2006) find evidence
supporting Kaldor's first law at the state level, while Roy
(2013) and Sankaran and Samantaraya (2015) respectively find
evidence of causality running from services growth to GDP
growth, and from GDP growth to industrial growth. In the case

14

On the limitations of the TFP literature see Felipe and McCombie (2013).
In particular, it is essential to note that TFP might not be a measure of
productivity.
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of China, Hansen and Zhang (1996) and Jeon (2006) find
evidence supporting Kaldor's first law.
Kaldor also focused on the relationship between
manufacturing productivity growth and the growth of
manufacturing output, which has come to be known as Kaldor's
second law. The second law asserts that manufacturing
productivity growth is positively related with the growth of
the manufacturing sector, and presumably can be extended for
the economy as a whole. That builds on previous work by
Verdoorn (1949), and is known in the literature as KaldorVerdoorn’s Law.
Verdoorn's law, which is a generalization of Kaldor's
second law asserts that aggregate productivity growth is
positively related with the growth of overall output.
Verdoorn's law therefore captures the structural effect on
productivity growth. The cyclical influence on productivity
growth can be captured by Okun's law, which says that if an
economy grows above its potential growth rate, unemployment
will decrease, but less than proportionately to the excess of
output growth over the potential growth rate. This is because
productivity growth is pro-cyclical.
The results from our estimation for both countries are
similar, thus, suggesting that the estimated Verdoorn and Okun
coefficients are robust (see Appendix for estimation), and
indicate relatively large Kaldor-Verdoorn effects of almost
one to one increase in productivity associated to growth
expansion. If the Kaldor-Verdoorn story holds, then
conventional views that suggest that a slowdown and the
possibility of a middle-income trap for developing countries
is associated with an exogenous decrease in productivity seem
implausible. One would have to look into other areas to
understand the possibility of a growth slowdown. It seems
clear that for many developing economies the balance of
payments constitutes the main constraint on economic growth.
One way of looking at both countries' comparative problems is
to look at their export performance, and how the manufacturing
versus services-led strategies cope with the external
constraint.
Figure 4 shows the shares of services to goods exports
and merchandise to total exports for the two countries, and
includes the period after China's entry into the World Trade
Organization (WTO). In China, merchandise exports have
dominated total exports, accounting for around 90 percent of
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total exports for the most part of this period, barring a
brief period in the late-1990s and early 2000s. In the case of
India, while merchandise exports also accounted for the larger
share in total exports, this share has shown a downward trend
since the late 1990s, and in the period shown, the service
sector takes the lead. Since 2004, the average share of
merchandise exports has been around 65 percent. The share of
services exports has exceeded 30 percent of goods exports for
most of the 2000s.

Figure 4 – Service and Merchandise Exports (% Goods
Exports)
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An examination of the external accounts of the two
countries reveals striking differences in their external
performance and competitiveness. As Figure 5 shows, the
Chinese current account has been in persistent surpluses since
the 1990s, whereas the Indian current account has been in
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persistently in deficit, with the exception of the early
2000s.

Figure 5 – Current Account (% Goods Exports)
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Source: World Development Indicators (WDI) database of the World Bank and
author's calculations.

The Chinese surpluses reflect a combination of factors.
One factor is the growing integration of China into East Asian
regional production networks, or Global Value Chains (GVCs),
especially in the case of consumer electronics exports, and
the prominence of foreign firms in Chinese exports. Firms that
are headquartered in the US and European Union (EU) have
tended to export intermediate goods from more advanced Asian
economies to their Chinese affiliates. These intermediate
goods are assembled into final goods in China and are then
exported mainly to the US and EU countries (Tong and Zheng,
2008). Also, while China has certainly inserted itself in the
GVCs, it is clear that it also pursues policies associated
with promoting national champions, as in previous experiences
of developmental states (Wade, 2016).
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Some authors have also emphasized the effects of a pegged
exchange rate regime that has helped to keep the yuan or
renminbi undervalued, while others suggest that high levels of
domestic savings, and lower domestic consumption have
contributed to the trade and current account surpluses in
China (e.g. Makin, 2007; Song, Storesletten and Zilibotti,
2011). However, there are reasons to be skeptical about the
role of the exchange rate in the successful upgrading of the
Chinese productive structure and the export basket. 15 Note,
while low real wages and a significant real depreciation of
the currency in the early phases of liberalization might have
played an important role in the initial growth process, the
rapid rate of real wage growth in China, and higher inflation,
has implied a significant appreciation of the real exchange
rate, and that is true for most of the 2000s (Figure 6).

Figure 6- Real Exchange Rate (1960 = 100)
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Source: International Financial Statistics (IFS) database of the
International Monetary Fund and author's calculations.

15Both

Gereffi (2009) and Felipe et al. (2010a) argue that industrial
policies were central to the upgrading of the productive structure in
China.
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In the case of Indian deficits, Nabar-Bhaduri (2018) has
shown that the Indian trade deficits are a manifestation of a
dependence on the imports of intermediate goods (both oil and
non-oil), a rising import content of exports and a narrow
export basket that has also mainly consisted of intermediate
manufactured goods. The narrow composition of the export
basket particularly with respect to manufactured exports has
to some extent been the outcome of specific challenges that
have arisen in the post-liberalization era such as reduced
bank lending to the Indian commercial sector, the
disappearance of development financial institutions, an
underdeveloped private bonds market, persistence of inadequate
infrastructure, antidumping measures and non-tariff barriers
for industrial products in other countries, and the bias of
the Indian government’s fiscal concessions towards services. 16
These persistent deficits have meant that India has
relied on capital inflows to offset the trade deficits and
sustain the current account deficit. An analysis of the
composition of these capital inflows highlights elements of
financial fragility entailed by these trade and current
account deficits, and India's broader services-led trajectory.
It is worthwhile analyzing the composition of Indian capital
inflows. While other investment inflows accounted for the
largest share during most of the 1990s, during the 2000s, the
composition of capital inflows shifted towards Foreign Direct
Investment (FDI) and portfolio investment, with the combined
shares of these two categories surpassing the other investment
category.
In several years in the 2000s, the share of portfolio
inflows exceeded FDI inflows. The share of other investment
inflows remained significant at more than 30 percent of total
capital inflows in the 2000s, and post-2010, the share of this
category has been steadily growing, accounting for more than
40 percent of total capital inflows. The main components under
this category have consisted of external commercial
borrowings, non-resident Indian (NRI) deposits and trade
credit. These trends indicate a growing prominence of both
short-term capital inflows, and debt-creating capital inflows
in the Indian economy. While short-term portfolio inflows and
external commercial borrowings may presently finance external
16It

must be noted that Felipe et al. (2010b) suggest that India, although
less successful than China, has also pursued industrial policies that make
its export basket more sophisticated than what it would be expected on the
basis of its income per capita level.
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deficits and aid credit expansion, an overdependence on
capital inflows increases financial fragility by entailing
sudden stop risks and could worsen external competitiveness
through an appreciation of the real exchange rate. They also
generate liabilities which must be paid off at a future date.
Remittances have also played a significant role in closing the
current account deficit.
While the Indian current account has been in persistent
deficit, the Chinese current account has been for the most
part in surplus. This would indicate that while external
financial fragility is an issue for India, it should not be
seen as a serious threat in the Chinese case. However, it is
important to notice in this context that the trade surplus
shrank significantly in China, and that both a development
strategy more reliant on domestic market within the context of
trade conflicts with the United States suggest that the
conventional export-led strategy has reached its limits.

Figure 7 – Guidotti-Greenspan Ratio
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Both countries are far from being close to a currency
crisis. Figure 7 shows the Guidotti-Greenspan ratio (the ratio
of reserves to short-term external debt) for China and India.
The Guidotti-Greenspan rule says that a country should hold an
amount of reserves equal to its short-term external debt. In a
situation in which a country is holding an amount of reserves
exactly equal to its short-term debt, the Guidotti-Greenspan
ratio would be one. Both countries meet the Guidotti-Greenspan
rule, with the ratio in both countries being greater than one,
standing at 3.87 in China and 4.32 in India in 2016. For
India, the exceptions are 1990 and 1991, the time when the
country was experiencing a balance of payments crisis. 17
More importantly, in China the strategy of
internationalizing the yuan, and the desire to make it an
international reserve currency, have created additional
opportunities for a rising middle and higher middle class to
diversify their portfolios. The result has been a significant
loss of reserves in the last few years, which do not endanger
the external situation in the short run, but raise questions
about the limits to the Chinese catching up process. In our
view, it is the external constraint, and the rising awareness
in the United States that has led to a shift to more managed
trade.
There might be a middle-income trap after all, but the
main reason for its preponderance is neither technological, as
Kaldor-Verdoorn suggest, nor demography. It is the result of
the balance of payments constraint, and the necessity to
borrow in foreign currency. The current era of
financialization, and low interest rates in the center,
particularly in the United States, however, has opened space
for developing countries to borrow in domestic currencies. In
that respect, the argument put forward by Grabel (2017), who
suggests that the current era of emergent incoherence fosters
somewhat surprisingly stability, seems relevant. This seems to
have allowed for an expansion of the developmental space for
peripheral countries, something that would have been
unconceivable at the beginning of the century.18

17

For an analysis that puts the emphasis of currency crises on the
external accounts, rather than the fiscal accounts, and the role of debt in
foreign currency see Cline and Vernengo (2016).
18 See, for example, Wade (2003), who noted the significant limits to
development strategies in the periphery with the creation of the World
Trade Organization (WTO).
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Conclusion
While it seems reasonable to assume that some of the
predictions about the rise of China and India, and
particularly about the changes to the Sinocentric world
economic order are exaggerated, it is important to understand
the relative rise of the two countries in comparative
perspective. It is clear that to some degree the current
success of both economies was associated not with the simple
policy rules of the Washington Consensus, in which
privatization, liberalization and deregulation played a
central role. While significant liberalization did take place,
the role of the State, through direct public investment, and
through several forms of indirect policy intervention, has
been key for fast growth and the catch-up process with the
West. It is clear that China has what has been termed in the
literature as a developmental state, but it is less clear that
this is the case in India.
Also, it is important to emphasize that while growth has
been high in both countries, the ability to incorporate
workers, and integrate into the global value chains has been
markedly different, with the more traditional
industrialization strategy of China faring better than the
service-led model of India. Not only in terms of employment
generation, but also in terms of gains in productivity, and
export performance, the industrialization strategy seems more
conducive to catching-up.
In part, the geopolitical preoccupations of the Chinese
State, the symbiotic relation with the United States for a
long period, until recently, and the need for natural
resources, which led to a process of internationalization of
Chinese economic interests in other peripheral areas of the
world, has implied a development strategy similar to the
developmental state model that countries like Japan and South
Korea had adopted in the past. Whether that model would be
enough to promote catching-up or lead to a middle-income trap,
in the current international environment, is unclear, but it
seems that if a limit were to arise it would be from the
balance of payments constraint. That is certainly not on the
near horizon.
The case of India is more complex, since the
developmental strategy pursued is less conventional, and, in
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spite of higher rates of growth in the very recent past, it is
more prone to external limitations. India has yet to unleash
the process of structural transformation of the agricultural
sector, that would lead to a significant increase of
employment, and the expansion of mass consumption in the
domestic market, the hallmark of industrialization and
development. The absence of a clear state-led plan in that
direction, and the absence of successful development
experiences that have not used some of these strategies,
suggests that a middle-income trap scenario is more likely in
the Indian case.
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Appendix
There are no estimates of Verdoorn effects for China and
India, and also no joint estimated of Okun and Verdoorn
effects. Rada and von Arnim (2012) use a model which
emphasizes the importance of a growing share of formal sector
employment to examine possible macroeconomic policies that
could sustain structural transformation in China and India,
and they use Verdoorn effects in their simulation results. We
try to estimate some preliminary results for both Okun and
Verdoorn effects on both countries, providing empirical
support for their simulation model.
The methodology adopted in this paper for the estimates
for India and China’s Okun and Verdoorn and Okun effects
follows Jeon and Vernengo (2008). The method tries to separate
the cyclical or short-run effects (Okun) from the structural
or long-term effects (Verdoorn). Note that Okun’s Law implies
that productivity is pro-cyclical, and the Kaldor-Verdoorn
suggests that productivity trends results from output growth.
The method adopted precludes the need for finding potential
output, and requires a partitioned regression. The equation
estimated is given by:
𝑝 = 𝑎 + 𝑏𝑔 + 𝑏𝑐Δ𝑢
In the equation p stands for labor productivity, g for
GDP growth and u is the change in unemployment. The Verdoorn
coefficient, b, is directly observable in the equation, and
the Okun coefficient, c, must be calculated after running the
regression by dividing the joint coefficient bc by b. A
partitioned regression is used to obtained a change in
unemployment that is not correlated with GDP growth. The
regression results for both the OLS and partitioned regression
estimations suggested the presence of autocorrelation. To
correct for autocorrelation, the Cochrane-Orcutt
transformation was used.
The data used in the analysis are from the World
Development Indicators (WDI) database of the World Bank. For
each country, the estimation covers the period from 1993 to
2017, and the dependent variable is labor productivity. For
China, the estimated Verdoorn effect remains 0.89 and
statistically significant at the 5 percent level in the
partitioned regression estimation, with the change in the
unemployment rate modified to be uncorrelated with GDP growth.
For India, the estimated Verdoorn effect is 0.88. However, the
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Okun effect is are economically insignificant for both China
and India, and statistically insignificant for China. Note
that this should be expected in economies that do not
experience recessions in the period analyzed.

Table 5. Okun-Verdoorn Estimates (1993-2017)
China
Constant
g
u
AR(1)
Adjusted R2

India
0.00
0.89*
(21.4)
0.00
(1.25)
0.02
0.95

-0.01
0.88*
(12.5)
0.00*
(2.92)
0.71
0.88

* Significant at P<0.05

These results appear to be consistent with what we would
expect in developing countries experiencing rapid economic
growth. In such situations, high rates of GDP growth would
enable rapid productivity growth because of increasing returns
to scale, with the rapid growth of output being made possible
by an expanding aggregate demand and by tapping into surplus
labor. Thus, the Verdoorn effect would be large. However,
since developing countries are do not experience significant
recessions, but only slowdowns in the fast growth, cyclical
fluctuations and, hence the Okun effect, is likely to be
smaller.
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